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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
EDITED BY RICHARD B. BILDER 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism 
AJier Kosovo. By Michael J. Glennon. New York; 
Hampshire, England: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. x, 
239. Index. $49.95; £35. 
For the past half century, the international law 
regime regarding the use offorce seemed to take 
as fundamental the UN Charter's flat and abso-
lute ban on states using force, except in self-de-
fense, against other states. NATO's 1999 bombing 
campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing by the 
Milosevic regime of Serbia in its province of 
Kosovo put into question the viabilityofthat Char-
ter-based system. Milosevic was directing his blood-
letting against inhabitants of his own nation; no 
one seriously argued that the nations of NATO 
had to bomb Serbia into submission as a form of 
literal self-defense. Moreover, the Security Coun-
cil did not authorize the bombing campaign, and 
while the campaign's proponents could attribute 
this failure to crass Russian and Chinese agendas, 
the absence of Security Council resolutions of 
authorization even further removed the use of 
force from colorable legal justification under the 
Charter. 
Some commentators justified this use offorce 
by an expansive doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention, but even those approving the campaign 
acknowledged the gap between such a doctrine 
and the original intent of the Charter. I In Limits 
of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After 
Kosovo, Michael Glennon of the University of Cal-
ifornia, Davis, Law School starts byacknowledg-
ing this gap and proceeds to conduct "a critical, 
I W. Michael Reisman, Kosovos Antinomies, 93 AJIL 
860' (1999) ("NATO's action in Kosovo did not accord 
,with the design of the United Nations Charter"); Richard 
Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of Intemational 
Law, 93 AJIL 847,850 (1999) (acknowledging as "co-
herent" the "anti-intervention argument" that "the by-
passing of UN authority is seen as a devastating consti-
tutional blow to the authority of the Organization, and 
to the most basic prohibition inscribed in the interna-
tionallaw governing recourse to force"). 
top-down reassessment of the whole use-of-force 
edifice" (p. 4). His direct and eminently readable 
study goes far beyond identifying the irreconcil-
ability of the Kosovo bombing campaign and the 
Charter. Rather, Glennon effectively scoffs at what 
the structure of Charter-based use-of-force law has 
become, labeling it as a fifty-year doctrinal exper-
iment that no longer works, and taking a sharp 
logical axe to the many attempts at propping up 
that venerable structure. 
Glennon's challenge, further elaborated in his 
writings since the attacks of September II, 2001,2 
has major implications both for use-of-force law, 
in general, and for the Cnited States' own legal 
stance on the use offorce, in particular. If the cen-
tral post-World War II legal structure designed to 
contain the dogs of war has been undermined to 
the point of crumbling, just what confines them 
now? More specifically, if the Cnited States can 
make its own decisions on the use of force without 
constraint by Charter-based law, does anything le-
gally restrain it other than the calculations of real-
politik?Glennon adopts the heretical approach of 
following these lines of questioning to their full 
limit. His direct, no-nonsense analysis succeeds in 
stripping away his readers' comforting illusions 
that the Charter edifice is sufficiently in tact to be 
easily defended. That analysis deserves full eluci-
dation, after which we see how the Charter-based 
regime, rather than lapsing as Glennon suggests, 
might be seen as continuing on in a somewhat 
adapted form. 
The starting point for Glennon's substantive 
analysis is that the Kosovo campaign violated the 
flat textual prohibition in Article 2( 4) of the Char-
ter against "the .threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state." He reviews Oscar Schachter's studies3 
" Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defellse, In-
herence, and Incoherence ill Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, 25 HM\', J, LA\\' & PL'B. POL. 539 (2002); Michael 
J. Glennon, Preempting Tenonsm: He Cme for Anticipa-
tory Self-Defense, WEEKLYSTANDARD,j.-IS, 28. 2002, at 24. 
~ OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTER:>;A TlONAL L-\\\'I:>;THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 128-29 (1991). 
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of the Charter's travaux preparatoires-in which 
Schachter found no exception to the prohibition 
against nondefensive force, in general, and cer-
tainly none for humanitarian intervention, such 
as in the Kosovo campaign. Moreover, Glennon 
shreds (as having "scant support") the argument 
of some commentators' that, by a backhanded 
method, the Security Council "authorized NATO 
to use force against Yugoslavia" (p. 32). 
Glennon rejects the argumen ts set forth in Hu-
manilamln lnteroention (particularly its second, 1997 
edition) by Fernando Teson, who used examples of 
state practice to contend that humanitarian inter-
ven tion was consonan t wi th the Charter.:; Glen non 
debates Teson over such central examples as the 
1971 intervention in West Pakistan (later Bangla-
desh), the 1979 intervention in Uganda, the 1979 
intervention in the Central African Republic, and 
the United States' 1983 intervention in Grenada. 
Each, Glennon argues, has problems as a prece-
dent, with respect both to the intervening states' 
nonhumanitarian motives and the reluctance of 
responsible officials to cite humanitarian inter-
vention as ajustification. 
Glennon's challenge to the Charter's use-of-
force regime continues with his argument that it 
has failed, in practice, to achieve its goal. Citing 
a study of sixty-five international conflicts that pro-
duced a total of eleven million deaths between 
1945 and 1996, he rejects the theories of Louis 
Henkin, Thomas Franck, and others that the of-
ten pacific contemporary interactions of states 
are a reflection of a viable, Charter-based legal 
regime." It is illusory, he argues, to try to fit 
within the obsolete categories of Charter-based 
law the extent and diversity of either the use or 
nonuse of force. The Charter has simply lost its 
relevance, as (in Glennon'sjudgment) the Koso-
vo intervention makes readily apparent. 
In an even more controversial position, Glennon 
challenges the legal justifications for the Security 
Council's authorizations to use force to deal with 
intrastate violence. In this context, he surveys 
authorizations "beginning with Southern Rhodesia 
• "[Tlhe United States is notamiss in claiming some 
measure of legitimacy from Security Council resolu-
tions .... " Ruth M. Wedgwood, Nato's Campaign in 
Yugoslavia, 93 AJIL 828,829 (1999). 
, Seealso SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD 
ORDER (1996). 
,; See, e.g., LOUlSHENKlN,HOWNATlONSBEHAVE:LAW 
AND FOREIGN POLlCY (2d cd. 1979); Thomas M. Franck, 
LessonsofKosovo, 93A:lIL857, 85!J (1999) (commenting 
on Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: '['he 
Searrhfor a Just Intemationlli Law, FOREIGN AFF., Mayl 
June 1999, at 2). 
and continuing with legally questionable inter-
ventions in South Africa, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, 
and Haiti" (p. 114). It is not that Glennon disputes 
the morality or, in most instances, even the wis-
dom ofthe interventions. He shares the common 
horror at "stomach-wrenching atrocities" (p. 141) 
such as the "mass slaughter of the Tutsi popula-
tion" in Rwanda, where "the dead numbered 
500,000 to one million" (p. 119). But he fI::iects 
the conflation of the consenslls against genocide 
with the legal issue of how, in view of the autho-
rized interventions, Article 2(7) 's principle of non-
intervention "within the domestic jurisdiction" 
could still be deemed to be honored-other 
than in the breach.7 
Glennon acknowledges that the bloodiest prob-
lem of violence today occurs not between organized 
states, but at less organized levels, ranging from 
ethnic warfare within failed nations, to terrorism. 
And he acknowledges the emerging pattern of re-
sponse by regional organizations and alliances, 
acting usually (though not always, as in the case 
of Kosovo) under some degree of Security Coun-
cil authorization, as in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Tajik-
istan, and the former Soviet Union. While recog-
nizing that there is some merit to this "adaptivist" 
approach (p. 123)-an important concession-he 
nevertheless sees in it a breakdown of the Char-
ter-based regime because the Security Council, a 
"creature" of its Charter (p. 126), has been inter-
vening in ways that its creators (that is, states) 
"would never have agreed to" (p. 135). 
In place of what Glennon sees as a defunct 
Charter-based regime, he does envision the "even-
tual establishment of a tme legalist system to govern 
use of force" (p. 11). In his judgment, however, 
that time is decades away, for he sketches vividly 
an assertedly unbridgeable clash of viewpoints: 
between the West as supporter of the use offorce 
when necessary, and Russia and China, which 
fear it; and also between developed nations, which 
generally might employ humanitarian interven-
tion as a means of bringing order to a chaotic 
Third World, and undeveloped nations, which 
view such intervention as smacking of colonialism. 
7 Various scholars have presented strong arguments 
that the contemporary meaning of "domesticjurisdic-
tion" must and should reflect the evolution of i nte rna-
tionallaw since the time of the Charter. \Nhile Glennon 
respects these arguments, he argues against them on sev-
eral levels, ranging from an adamantine emphasis on 
original intent to the unsoundness of an evolving inter-
pretation of the Charter on this particular matter. "The 
limits explicitly imposed by Article 2(7) ... constitute 
express proscriptions. To argue for power to override 
express proscriptions is, in a very real way, to argue 
against the rule oflaw" (p. 128). 
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Until a new "legalist system" emerges, Glennon 
credits in practice "the same solution had in 
Kosovo: Humanitarian intervention by preexisting 
regional coalitions of democracies" (p. 198), but 
he does not consider such intervention to be 
pursuant to a regime of international law based 
on the Charter (except, in effect, in name only). 
Thus, a~ he comments on the Kosovo campaign: 
"Clearly the Charter was breached, but international 
law? Using international law's traditional meth-
ods, no one can say" (pp. 180-81). 
In newer writings published in the wake of the 
September 200] attacks-and while the Bush ad-
ministration audibly contemplated scenarios in 
which the use of U.S. force helps topple Saddam 
Hussein in order to preempt the Iraqi threat of 
using weapons of ma~s destruction-Glennon has 
argued that the UN Charter's proscription of pre-
emptive force can no longer be interpreted, within 
a contemporary context, as barring such preemp-
tive actions." He therefore asks both commenta-
tors and officials today "to make way for the new 
without remaining wedded to the old" (p. 205). 
That is, he urges the development of a new in-
ternationallaw on the use of force-law based on 
what states do now and would agree to do in the 
future, not on an outmoded, Charter-based doc-
trinal structure based on a superseded vision of 
the world from half a century ago. 
Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power presents its 
arresting thesis elegantly and concisely. Glennon 
deploys a varied array of legal tools witll relentless 
intellectual honesty. He coolly and objectively cred-
its foreign legal assessments as often being more 
valid than U.S. ones. He bluntly declares, "There 
is no question that Russia and China were correct 
in arguing iliat NATO's bombing violated the Char-
ter" (p. 29). He reminds us iliat when told by Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary Robin Cook that the lawyers 
were having difficulty coming up wiili justifications 
for the Kosovo intervention under the Charter-
based system, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
responded, "Get new lawyers" (p. 178). Glennon 
embeds his legal analysis in the history of intern a-
tional relations and the sociology of cultural dif-
ferences about force. The tone is conversational, 
and the pace is brisk. Readers seeking a more ab-
strusely technical treatment can follow, if they 
choose, the ample footnotes to studies on subjects 
ranging from the classical Roman doctrine of de-
suetude, to Web sites on contemporary legal 
theory. 
H See sulJm sources cited note 2. 
Not many readers will take issue specificallvwith 
Glennon's core point: the absence of a smooth 
legalistic fit between the Kosovo campaign and the 
UN Charter. In the judgment of this reviewer, 
however, there is a danger of allowing a hard case 
(Kosovo) to make bad law-or, in this instance, 
to nullify a whole body of good law. The Charter 
marked an enormous and beneficial development 
beyond the open-ended customary law of war of 
an earlier era, which allowed some states to view 
as lawful the "usc offorce to assert legal rights, to 
settle disputes."!' Force is still sometimes used to 
resolve disputed territorial claims-from Indone-
sia's occupation of East Timor, to Argentina's in-
vasion of the Falkland Islands, to Iraq's ill-fated 
invasions of Iran in 1980 and of Kuwait in 1990. 
But the Charter regime seems effectively to have 
delegitimated such irredentist acts, very few of 
which have succeeded in the long run. "In reality, 
the rules of the game ha,'e changed dramatically 
in the last half-centun·. The liberty to venture into 
war, and generally to employ inter-State force, is 
obsolete."I" 
Glennon is correct that contemporary state 
practice hardl~' fits neatly into the Charter's orig-
inal intent. Still, in both the General Assemblv 
and the Security Council, discourses about th~ 
use offorce within the framework of the Charter 
have proceeded over the past half century with 
some value. The Third \\'orld has articulated its 
expanded exceptions to the Charter in order to 
permit assistance in conflicts of national libera-
tion,just as the United States has articulated its 
own preferred expanded exceptions in order to 
permit reprisals against telTorism (for example, Lib-
ya in 1986, and Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998), 
and also to ad"ance other security interests (Pan-
ama, Iraq, and Haiti just in the last dozen years). 
The resulting legal structure has some of the flaws 
iliat Glennon identifies, but few seem to want a re-
version to what, before the Charter, appeared in 
practice to have sunk \'irtuall\' to the law of the 
jungle. . 
One possible problem with Glennon's analysis 
is that there may be more potential than he' ac-
knowledges for de\'eloping a sound legal system 
for collective security, il1\'oh'ing roles for both the 
Security Council and the regional organizations, 
by evolution from the original institutions and 
!I IAN BRO\\,:>;UE, INTER:>;ATIONAL LA\\' AND THE liSE 
or FORCE BY STATES 250 (1963). 
10 YORAM OINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-OE-
n:NSE 93 (2d ed. 1994). 
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concepts in the Charter-based system. I I By creat-
ing the Security Council and recognizing a role 
for regional collective-security organizations, the 
Charter launched something that amounts to 
more-legally-than a spot con tr<lct between states. 
The Security Council and regional organizations, 
as international institutions established with con-
siderably open-ended expecw.tions, contribute to 
the evolution of law and deIive credibility in their 
collective-security role not just from states' origi-
nal consent to the Charter iL~elf, but also from 
states' continuing participation and support.l~ 
Accepting, as Glennon suggesLs, that international 
law founded upon the Charter sometimes seems 
these days almost as much patch as fabric, it is 
nonetheless true that patching by institutional-
ized processes that have independent legitimacy, 
as well as their original foundation in the Char-
ter, amounts to something more than the lapse 
and desuetude of the Charter system. 
The animosity of Russia and China toward the 
NATO campaign in Kosovo has given way, since 
September II, to at least a temporarily renewed 
recognition of common security interests among 
the great powers. Suppose that this concern about 
secUIitycontinues and that severe problems, wheth-
er potential or actual, stimulate further develop-
ment of the international regime on the use of 
force. For example, suppose that the collapse of 
other states or the actions of in te rn ally genocidal 
regimes threaten to bring whole populations to 
the fate of Rwanda; or that peaceful national gov-
ernments suffer replacement by ones with aggres-
sive and destabilizing intentions, as in the former 
Yugoslavia; or that governments with hostile, ag-
gressive attitudes like those of Iraq show evident 
capability and intent to unleash weapons of mass 
destrnction. Under such circumstances, the inter-
national community may well shift its views to-
II See, e.g., CHRISTI:-IEGRAY,INTERNATIONALL\\\'A:-ID 
THE USE OF FORCE (2000). 
I" See e.g., John Quigley, Tile United Nations Serurity 
COllnfil: Promethean Protertor or HeljJless Hostage? 35 TEX. 
INT'LL..J. 129 (2000); Sean D. Murphy, TheSerunty Coun-
cil, Legitimacy, lind the Cona'!)t ojCollertilieSerunty After the 
Cold War, 32 COLU~I.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 201 (1994). Events 
and politics of the last decade (as with the 1994 Soma-
lia intervcntion) have reduced the Icgitimacyaccorded 
domestically in the United States to the usc of force 
having only Security Council approval, but have in-
creased such legitimacy when NATO has also given iL~ 
approval. Charles Tiefer, AdjllstingS01lereignty: Con tempo-
rm)' Congressional-Ewelltilll' COlltrollasies Abollt Intema-
tiollal Orgrllli:atiol/S, 35 TEX. I;\T'L L..J. 239, 254-57 
(~WOO); Charles Tiefer, War/)l'cisio1lS in the Latl'I990s 1'1' 
Partial Cmlg'ressiullf/I Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. f, 
14-15 (1999). 
ward approval of more interventionist and pre-
emptive approaches to the use of force than the 
Charter initially envisaged a half century ago. The 
overpowering suspicion among weaker states re-
garding the actions of stronger ones-a suspicion 
that underlay the Charter's narrow view of lC!~it­
imate use offorce-would yield to an acceptance 
of regionally organized intervention, under the 
approval of the Security Council, as more legit-
imate than any alternative. 
Recurrent patterns oflegally respectable use of 
force would gradually lead to ac!iustments in the 
rules of the past without the clear-cut demise of 
the Charter-ba~ed system. I:1 Rather, over time, the 
adaptation of the existing system would maintain 
the inherited set of Charter-based institutions as 
still the best available basis for world discourse 
about the legitimate use offorce. Even the substan-
tive rules regarding the occasions for use of force 
would still be recognizable, albeit perhaps in an 
evolved form. Force would continue to be illegal 
when used without broad multilateral interna-
tional authorization (generally from the Security 
Council, though sometimes, as in Kosovo, from 
other sources), or when used for other than essen-
tially defensive and order-promoting purposes to 
counter threats to the peace. The shift would be 
in the definition of what constitutes a threat to 
international peace and secuIity. These threats-
which would provide the basis for collective de-
cisions on the use of force-would increasingly 
be recognized to include both the internal blood-
letting that generates regionally destabilizing ref-
ugee streams or ethnic tensions, as Serbia's ac-
tions did, and the development of weapons of 
mass destruction by states with demonstrated ag-
gressive tendencies, as in the case of Iraq. The 
Charter's oIiginal, narrow notion ofwhatconstitu-
ted a threat to the peace would thereby be broad-
ened, as Glennon ably demonstrates, but the use of 
force would still be confined to essentially order-
promoting and hence secuIity-preserving purposes, 
and would not extend to humanitarian purposes 
as such. Meanwhile, the great advance made and 
codified by the Charter-de legitimating the use 
offorce for state selt:aggrandizemen t, for the res-
olution of disputes having no collective-security 
element, and for other purposes unrelated to 
1:\ Other commentators who have recently pursued a 
similar line of analysis include, in these pages, Jonathan 
Charnev in his 1999 editorial on the Kosovo interven-
tion. S,,;'Jonathan I. Charney, NATO's KoslJTJO Intl'll/en-
tion: Anticipatury Humanitarian Inteml'lItion in KOSOTJo, 93 
AlII. 834, 838-39 (1999). 
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threaL~ to international order-would continue, 
as modified, to be respected. 
The rest of the world would hetter tolerate the 
actions of Western stales, and of the United States 
in particular, if those states strelched, hut acknowl-
edged, the existing system of the use of force in 
this way rather than simply acting as if there were 
no legal conslraint~ at all on the use of their weap-
onry. It is one thing f(lr the United States, as in 
the Kosovo campaign, to transgress the Charter's 
original rules-as Glennon usefully clarifies lhat 
it did-while at the same lime also relying upon 
other multilateral sources oflegitimacy. It is quite 
another thing for the United States to claim free-
dom from well-estahlished standards when taking 
military actions solely because it deems them to 
be in it~ own self-interest. 
Whatever may he the potential for such an adap-
tive and evolutionary path, Umil.l of Law illumi-
nates the powerful contradictions in today's law 
on the use of force, and engages its readers in 
tough-minded analysis of the import of those 
contradictions. Has the world drifted so far from 
the UN Charter of 1945 that the old rules con-
tinue only as figment~ of diplomatic douhle-talk? 
Do the de facto practices today depart so much 
li'om the norms as to render Charter-reading le-
gal advisers the priesthood of a defunct cult? 
Glennon's analysis may well come to he seen as 
one that disclosed the necessity of substantial re-
placement-at least for large components of the 
original Charter-based regime regulating the use 
of force, if not for the regime's whole set of in-
stitutions and principles. By the same token, his 
analysis has prepared the way intellectually for the 
reoriented legal regime that must eventually 
emerge-by one process or another-to handle 
the changing problems and perils of collective 
security. 
CHARLES TIEFER 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
Law and War: An American Story. By Peter H. 
Maguire. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000. Pp. xii, 42l. Index. $30. 
The destruction of the World Trade Center, 
President George W. Bush has repeatedly declared, 
constituted an attack not only on the United States, 
but on all states and peoples. It was not, there-
fore, simply the equivalent of an act of war; it was 
a crime against civilization. What follows, the 
president has further affirmed, is that all states 
should support the efforts of the L"nited States to 
hunt down and punish the perpetrators; for in so 
exerting itself, America is acting on behalf of the 
international community, as well as it~ own nation-
al interest. In brief, the president sees the United 
States acting in this instance as enforcer of the 
global order's basic norms and as executor of rai-
son d'etat. By the same token, in pursuance of the 
national and the human interest-that is, in mak-
in!{ war on terrorism-the president sees the 
L"nited States adherin!{ to the letter and spirit of 
the laws gm'erning the initi'ation and conduct of 
\\"ar, thereby distinguishing it~elffr{Jm iL~ enemies. 
As Peter \-laguire demonstrates in his well-timed 
book, Lml' IlIld Hrn; this most recent effort to sur-
rOllnd L' .S. war making "'ith an aura of legality 
has a long and decidedlv problematic pedigree. 
For most of American histon', he argues, this em-
phasis on le!{ali ty distinguished the L" nited States 
from the leading European states, which insisted 
un visualizing \\'ar as an incident ofso\'ereignty, or 
in Clausewitzian terms, a~ the continuation of pol-
itics hy other means-means that ha\'e no natural 
limits. For \laguire, the exemplar of the worldly 
European perspectil'e was the Second German 
Reich hefore it~ extinction in the coml.1lsi\"e after-
math of World War I. 
German and American perspecti\'es first clashed 
nakedly at the 1898-99 Hague Conference, con-
vened at the instance of that determined autocrat, 
Czar Nicholas II, to promote peace. The Germans 
and other Europeans pn)l"ed willing to endorse 
rules-on subjects such as flags of truce, the treat-
ment of prisoners, and armistice-designed to 
mitigate gratuitous suffering in the e\'ent of war. 
But "American statesmen wanted to go further 
... [and] reform statecraft it~elf"1 by securing 
agreement on compulsory recourse to arbitration 
-in the event that interstate disputes could not be 
resolved by diplomacy. Exemplifying the Ameri-
can elite's imagination of itself and of what distin-
guished the United States from the great powers of 
Europe, Joseph Choate. the chief L" .S. represen-
tative at the conference, spoke of war as "an anach-
ronism, like dueling or slayery, something that 
international society had simply outgrOlm" (p. 49). 
Although the U.S. proposal "'ould ha\'e encom-
passed only those "differences" that were "not of 
a character compelling or justifying war," it was 
still too much for the Gelmans, who belie\'ed that 
"treaties to limit arms and provide for 'neutral" 
arbitration of disputes negated [Germany's] most 
I CALVI:>; DEAR~16:>;o DA \'IS. THE l::>;ITED STA TES.-\:>;O 
THE SECOND H-\GL:E PEACE CO:>;FERE:>;CE 15- I 6 (1975) 
(quoted in Law and lVarat p. 48). 
